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Abstract 
The creation and empowerment of European Union (EU) agencies constitutes one of the most 
momentous developments of the EU composite administration. In the last decades, the delegation 
of powers to EU agencies grew exponentially both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As a result 
of this evolution and of the more permissive position of the Court of Justice of the EU in the Short 
selling judgment, EU agencies today are called upon to make relevant political, economic and social 
choices even in highly sensitive and contentious domains. The possibility to challenge their acts has 
been finally sanctioned in primary law. The exercise of their powers, however, is subject only to a 
limited scrutiny by the Court, which has recognized broad discretion to these bodies in carrying out 
complex and technical assessments. Analysing the approach of the Court to the review of European 
Chemical Agency’s (ECHA) discretion, this paper reflects upon its effectiveness and its implications 
for the accountability and legitimacy of agencies within the EU institutional framework. 
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1. Introduction 
The creation and empowerment of European Union (EU) agencies undeniably constitutes one of 
the most momentous developments of the EU composite administration. These permanent bodies 
with separate legal personality under EU public law, set up by the institutions through secondary 
legislation,1 represent “a specific institutional arrangement” which stands out within the EU 
institutional panorama.2 Since the 1990s, agencification has progressively grown both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. The growing involvement of the EU in deeply complex policy domains 
increasingly required forms of technical and scientific expertise from the rule-maker, which the EU 
institutions generally lacked.3 Often established as an ad hoc reaction to transnational crises, the EU 
agencies also represented a credible solution for the need to provide an effective implementation of 
EU law at the centralised level when the Member States could not accept a further empowerment of 
the Commission.4 
Thus, from the first agencies in the 1970s, which were entrusted with merely informational tasks, the 
number of decentralised agencies has exponentially increased to more than 30 bodies, which are 
significantly diverse in their functions, structure and in the powers conferred. Indeed, EU agencies 
not only carry out preparatory work for the decision-making of EU institutions, but they can also 
adopt acts of individual or general application vis-à-vis third parties.5 Although the conferral of far-
reaching powers to EU agencies without an express legal basis in the Treaties and without clear 
constitutional boundaries initially raised relevant concerns of legitimacy,6 this empowerment was 
unequivocally sanctioned by the Court in the Short Selling judgment under certain conditions.7 Thus, 
                                                          
1 According to the definition of EU agencies provided by Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies. Legal and Political Limits to the 
Transformation of the EU Administration (Oxford University Press 2016), 9. Compare this definition with the one proposed 
by Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability, (Oxford University Press 2013), 21. 
2 Edoardo Chiti, ‘European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment’ [2013] 19 European Law Journal 
93, 94. 
3 Madalina Busuioc, op. cit. (2013), 25. 
4 See Renaud Dehousse, ‘Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies’ [1997] 
4 Journal of European Public Policy 246. 
5 They are accordingly distinguished between ‘pre-decision-making’ agencies (or ‘de facto decision-making’ agencies) and 
genuine ‘decision-making’ agencies. See, inter alia, the taxonomy in Herwig C. H. Hofmann and Alessandro Morini, 
‘Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive through “Agencification”’ [2012] 37 European Law 
Review 419. 
6 Inter alia, Damien Gerardin, ‘The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the American 
Experience’ in Damien Girardin, Rodolphe Munoz and Nicolas Petit (eds), Regulation through agencies in the EU: a new 
paradigm of European governance (Edward Elgar 2005), 231; Ellen Vos, ‘Reforming the European Commission: What Role 
to Play for EU Agencies?’ [2000] 37 Common Market Law Review 1113. 
7 See Case C-270/12, UK v Council of the European Union and European Parliament (Short Selling) [2014] EU:C:2014:18.  
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in the shadow of primary law, EU agencies today are called upon to make relevant political, 
economic and social choices even in highly sensitive and contentious domains.8  
The exercise of these powers, however, requires them to be accountable, in particular judicially 
accountable, to comply with the tenets of democracy and the rule of law on which the EU is based.9 
As emphasised by the Court in Les Verts, the EU “is a Community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question 
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the 
Treaty.”10 A full judicial review of the exercise of their activities, however, is arguably faced with 
significant hurdles given, on the one hand, by the late recognition of agencies in primary law and, on 
the other hand, by the complexity of the assessments carried out by these bodies. Therefore, this 
paper will analyse the judicial review of the exercise of EU agencies’ powers, examining, firstly, the 
possibility of challenging agencies’ acts through an action for annulment according to Article 263 
TFEU in its historical evolution. Secondly, it will focus on the intensity of the scrutiny exercised by 
the Court on EU agencies’ discretion, adopting in particular as a case study the review of the acts of 
the European Chemical Agency (ECHA). Thirdly, the implications of a limited judicial review from 
a constitutional perspective will be considered. Although based on preliminary results, some 
conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 For a recent overview of this phenomenon, see the study carried out by Ellen Vos on behalf of the European 
Parliamentary Research Service, ‘EU Agencies, Common Approach and Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu (last accessed on 12.01.2019). 
9 Article 2 TEU; Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament [1986] EU:C:1986:166, para 23. 
10 Case 294/83, Les Verts, para 23. 
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2. The Reviewability of the Acts of EU Agencies 
Article 263(1) TFEU sets forth that the Court can review the legality of “acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”. Therefore, the 
possibility to challenge the acts adopted by agencies is now expressly provided in primary law, 
sanctioning the passive locus standi of EU agencies in actions for annulment. However, the mention 
of EU agencies in Article 263 TFEU was a significant innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
follows a long and erratic evolution of the case law on this point.11 
2.1. The Evolution of the Case Law on the Annulment of Agencies’ Acts 
Before the introduction of the mention of EU agencies in Article 263 TFEU, the jurisdiction over 
the acts of EU agencies was not immediately accepted by the Court. With the exception of the plea 
of illegality,12 the Court for a long time adopted a formalistic interpretation of the treaty provisions 
concerning judicial review, excluding the possibility to challenge agencies’ acts.13  
Nevertheless, certain founding regulations of the agencies contained a provision which conferred 
jurisdiction on the Court for the judicial review of their acts.14 These provisions, however, 
constituted an exception. In any case, the regulations generally limited the jurisdiction of the Court 
to cases concerning the contractual and non-contractual liability of these bodies and access to 
documents.15 These provisions concerning jurisdiction have been interpreted restrictively by the 
Court, not allowing the judicial review of other acts than those expressly mentioned.16 Therefore, 
emphasising that the agencies were not among the institutions listed in the relevant treaty provisions 
on jurisdiction, the Court used to reject the applications brought against acts with legal effects which 
                                                          
11 See Carlo Tovo, Le agenzie decentrate dell'Unione europea (Editoriale Scientifica 2016), 342-361. 
12 See Case T-120/99, Kik v UAMI [2001] EU:T:2001:189, para 21. 
13 Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 343. 
14 See Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No. 1920/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 1–13, p. 
1–8: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in actions brought against the Centre under Article 230 of the Treaty”; 
Article 27(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, OJ L 53, 22.2.2007, p. 1–14: " The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in actions brought 
against the Agency under the conditions provided for in Articles 230 and 232 of the Treaty.” For a criticism of this 
practice, which creates legal uncertainty, see Merijn Chamon, op. cit. (2016), p. 337. 
15 All the basic regulations contain a provision of this kind: “1. The contractual liability of the Authority shall be 
governed by the law applicable to the contract in question. The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall 
have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by the Authority. 
2. In the case of non-contractual liability, the Authority shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the 
laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by it or its servants in the performance of their duties. The 
Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in any dispute relating to compensation for such damage.” See, for instance, 
Article 47 of EFSA Regulation. 
16 See Case T-411/06, Solgema v EAR [2008] EU:T:2008:419, para 34. 
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affected third parties on grounds of inadmissibility.17 Although in the specific cases other judicial 
remedies were open to the applicants,18 the inadmissibility of a direct challenge of these acts 
appeared as a remarkable lacuna in the jurisdictional system of EU law.19 
Such a lacuna, actually, was attenuated by the existence of a sort of “administrative appeal” to the 
Commission20 and by the application of the SNUPAT case law to EU agencies.21 Thus, on the one 
hand, the basic regulations contained a mechanism which allowed for a referral of a contested 
measure of the agency to the Commission, which was required to review the legality of the measure. 
The subsequent decision of the Commission on the matter, then, constituted a challengeable act 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, thus providing an indirect means for judicial protection.22 
On the other hand, the Court applied the principle enshrined in SNUPAT to EU agencies, 
according to which the decisions adopted by auxiliary organs or agencies were to be attributed to the 
Commission. Indeed, considering that such bodies were created and derived their powers from the 
Commission, their acts were eventually imputable to the Commission.23 Therefore, it was possible 
for the applicant to challenge the decision of an agency, in particular of the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA), by lodging an application against the Commission24 - but this was possible against 
the Commission only.25 
However, the extension of this case law to EU agencies was far from being unproblematic. Firstly, it 
represented an exception to the consolidated principle that the action for annulment needs to be 
directed against the author of the act concerned, constituting the outcome of the decision-making 
power of that authority.26 Secondly, while the argument that the set up and delegation of powers 
                                                          
17 Case T-148/97, Keeling v OHIM [1998] EU:T:1998:114; Case C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust [2005] EU:C:2005:168, paras. 
36-37. 
18 As remarked in Case T-411/06, Solgema, para 45. 
19 This problematic aspect was also noted in European Commission, Communication - The operating framework for the 
European Regulatory Agencies, COM(2002) 718, last paragraph. 
20 As named by Richard H. Lauwaars, ‘Auxiliary Organs and Agencies in the EEC’ [1979] 16 Common Market Law Review, 
380. 
21 See Joined Cases 32-33/58, SNUPAT v High Authority [1959] EU:C:1959:18, 137-138. The case concerned an action 
for the annulment of a decision of the Imported Ferrous Scrap Equalization Fund, which was considered admissible by 
the Court because the Fund was set up and held its powers from the High Authority. Therefore, its decisions were to be 
equated to the decisions of the High Authority. 
22 See Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), p. 343. 
23 Joined Cases 32-33/58, SNUPAT v High Authority, EU:C:1959:18, pp. 137-138. 
24 Case T-123/00, Thomae v Commission, EU:T:2002:307, para 97. 
25 Case T-133/03, Schering-Plough v Commission and EMEA, EU:T:2007:365, para 23. 
26 Inter alia, Case C-201/89, Le Pen and Front National [1990] EU:C:1990:133, para 14; Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli v 
Commission [1992] EU:C:1992:491, paras 9-10; Case T-45/06, Reliance Industries v Commission and Council [2008] 
EU:T:2008:398, paras 50-51. Contra, another exception to the principle can be found in Case T-49/04, Hassan v Council 
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derived from the Commission was understandable in relation to the “Brussels agencies”27 or the 
executive agencies, the decentralised agencies are created and empowered by the legislator, i.e. the 
Council, or the Council and Parliament.28 Therefore, attributing the agency’s powers to the 
Commission constitutes a misunderstanding of the chain of delegation and of the institutional 
transformation occurred within the agencification phenomenon. Thirdly, the resulting rejection of 
any action brought against the EU agencies, on the ground that the Commission was the correct 
defendant,29 represented a distortion of the SNUPAT principle, which was originally put forward 
with the intention of expanding the jurisdiction of the Court and the judicial protection of 
individuals.30 Finally, both these mechanisms - the extension of the SNUPAT case law and the 
provision of an administrative appeal to the Commission - appeared at odds with the institutional 
independence of EU agencies, which operate at arm’s length from the authority of the 
Commission.31 
2.2. The Solgema Case and the Lisbon Treaty 
In light of these considerations, a revirement of the case law on the judicial review of the agencies’ acts 
was particularly desirable.32 The Court took this step only in 2008, just before the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
The Sogelma case, which concerned the annulment of decisions of the European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR) relating to a tender procedure, represented the turning point in the position 
of the Court on this matter.33 Ruling on the admissibility of the action, the Court started by recalling 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Commission [2006] EU:T:2006:201, para 59. See Grainne De Burca, “The Institutional Development of EU: A 
Constitutional Analysis” in Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 
1999), 76. 
27 Namely, the “Joint Bureau of Scrap Consumers” and the “Imported Ferrous Scrap Equalisation Fund”, which were 
the object of the case 9/56, Meroni, EU:C:1958:7. 
28 On the break in continuity among the two kind of bodies, see Merijn Chamon, “EU Agencies: Does the Meroni 
Doctrine Make Sense?’ [2010] Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 281; Merijn Chamon, ‘EU Agencies 
Between Meroni and Romano or the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea’[2011] 48 Common Market Law Review 1055; Carlo 
Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 348. 
29 See Case T‑133/03, Schering-Plough v Commission and EMEA, EU:T:2007:365, para 23. 
30 Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2011), p. 493; 
Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 348. 
31 Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 348. 
32 The extension of the Les Verts case law to EU agencies was particularly supported by LENAERTS Koen, ‘Regulating 
the Regulatory Process: Delegation of Powers in the European Community’ [1993] 18 European Law Review, 45-46. See 
also Case C-15/00, Commission v EIB [2003] EU:C:2003:396. 
33 Case T-411/06, Sogelma v EAR [2008] EU:T:2008:419. For a comment, see Elsa Bernard, ‘Recours contre les actes des 
agencies’ [2008] Europe, 14-16; Elisabetta Piselli, ‘Minimum Selection Criteria and their Application during the Evaluation 
Process: Sogelma Srl v European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)’ [2009] Public Procurement Law Review 83; Georges 
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the principle enshrined in Les Verts.34 Since the EU is “a community based on the rule of law”, the 
Treaties must be interpreted as permitting the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures 
adopted by its institutions. Accordingly, there is, in the general scheme of primary law, the possibility 
“to make a direct action available against all measures adopted by the institutions which are intended 
to have legal effects”.35 Although not expressly established in primary law, it derives from that case 
that “any act of a Community body intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties must be 
open to judicial review”, including acts of EU agencies.36 In the absence of such a possibility, there 
would be an unacceptable “legal vacuum” in the judicial review of EU acts.37 
The Court, thus, recognised an important continuity between the acts adopted by the institutions, in 
particular the Parliament in Les Verts, and those of the agencies, and could not accept that a 
delegation of powers from an institution to another body would deprive the applicants of judicial 
protection. Moreover, the reasoning of the Court was justified by the fact that, different from the 
previous cases, no other judicial remedy was available to the applicant.38 In this sense, the case has 
been read as a logical development of the previous case law, which, interpreted a contrario, would 
have paved the way for a recognition of direct action against agencies’ acts where no other remedies 
were available.39  
However, more than in the distinction of this case from the previous cases, this revirement of the 
Court should be considered in the light of the changing institutional context. Indeed, the Lisbon 
Treaty was already signed and about to enter into force, definitively opening the way for the direct 
judicial review of agencies’ acts.40 
2.3. The Last Lacuna: The Third Pillar Agencies 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Vandersanden, ‘Arrêt "Sogelma": l'annulation d'actes adoptés par des organes établis sur la base du droit dérivé’ [2008] 
Journal de droit européen, 297-298. 
34 Case 294/83, ‘Les Verts’, para 24. For an analysis, see Chapter 2, para 7.4. This case was cited already in the Opinion of 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust [2004] EU:C:2004:817, paras 15-21; and 
considered as crucial precedent before the case by Koen Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the Regulatory Process: Delegation of 
Powers in the European Community’ [1993] 18 European Law Review, 23; Edoardo Chiti, ‘An Important Part of the EU 
Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies’ [2009] 46 Common Market Law 
Review, p. 1420.35 Case T-411/06, Sogelma, para 36. 
35 Case T-411/06, Sogelma, para 36. 
36 Ibid, para 37. 
37 Ibid, para 40. 
38 Ibid, paras. 41-43. 
39 See Renzo Rossolini, ‘La competenza del giudice comunitario per l'annullamento degli atti delle agenzie europee’ 
[2009] Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali, 496; Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 351. 
40 See also Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 351. 
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Despite the improvements in the case law, a lacuna remained for certain agencies.41 Indeed, Europol 
and Eurojust remained outside judicial scrutiny since they were part of the so-called Third Pillar, 
thus being subject to limited scrutiny of the Court.42 In particular, the issue was raised in the Spain v 
Eurojust case, concerning the annulment of a call for application for the recruitment of temporary 
staff at the agency.43 While the Advocate General took a strong position for the admissibility of the 
annulment by making an analogy with Les Verts,44 the Court refused to take such an innovative step, 
steering clear from ruling on the matter.45 
For these agencies, therefore, the Lisbon Treaty constituted a true ground-breaking innovation, 
which finally filled this “significant and salient treaty lacuna”.46 With the abolition of the Pillar 
structure, also the agencies in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice are subject to the Court’s 
judicial review according to Article 263 TFEU. 47 
2.4. The Review of Acts Not Intended to Produce Legal Effects vis-à-vis Third Parties 
The expansion of the scope of the action for annulment in Article 263 TFEU to the agencies 
concerns the acts “intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”. Therefore, the acts 
adopted by genuine decision-making agencies, which are delegated formal powers towards third 
parties, can be challenged before the Court of Justice, lodging the action directly against the agency 
as defendant. In fact, a relevant number of actions against these agencies, such as the European 
Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) or the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), are 
now initiated every year in Luxembourg.48 
However, such direct action appears precluded in relation to agencies which do not exercise genuine 
decision-making powers. Indeed, certain agencies are involved in the preparation of acts eventually 
adopted by other institutions, issuing opinions which constitute the basis for the final decisions (the 
                                                          
41 See Madalina Busuioc, op.cit., 206. 
42 See Article 46 former TEU. For a criticism, see, inter alia, Steve Peers, ‘Salvation outside the Church: Judicial 
Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi Judgments’ [2007] 44 Common Market Law Review 885. 
43 Case C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust [2005] EU:C:2005:168. 
44 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust [2004] EU:C:2004:817, paras 20-21. 
45 Case C-160/03, Spain v Eurojust, para 41. 
46 Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution (Oxford University Press 
2009), 162. However, on the qualifications of this opening in relation to the transitional period and to the decisions of 
the JSBs of Europol and Eurojust, see Madalina Busuioc, op. cit. (2013), 210. 
47 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012), 159. 
48 For instance, in 2017 almost 300 actions were brought before the General Court just against EUIPO. 
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so-called “pre-decision-making agencies”49), or they adopt soft law measures such as 
recommendations, guidelines and other informal documents. 
Without entering the debate on the possible legal effects of soft law measures,50 these acts arguably 
do not fall within the definition of “acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties” as 
mentioned in Article 263 TFEU. While in actions for annulment the substance should prevail over 
the form of the act,51 the interpretation of the Court is clear in requiring that an act must have legally 
binding effects to be considered a challengeable act through a direct action according to Article 263 
TFEU.52  Even though scientific opinions of agencies such as EMA influence the Commission 
decision-making in such a way that these agencies can be considered the de facto decision-makers, the 
pre-decision-making agencies cannot be considered formally to exercise powers having binding legal 
effects towards third parties.53 
Although a direct action appears precluded by the wording of Article 263 TFEU, the acts of EU 
agencies which constitute preparatory acts of final acts adopted by an EU institution are still subject 
to judicial review indirectly, through the action lodged against the final act which they concurred to 
produce.  
It is settled case law that the invalidity of preparatory acts may lead to the annulment of the final 
decision.54 In relation to EU agencies, this principle was stated in particular in the Artegodan case,55 
which concerned the withdrawal of marketing authorisations of medicinal products. The decision of 
withdrawal was adopted by the Commission on the basis of a scientific opinion of the EMA which 
assessed the risks for human health of the substances at issue. In ruling on the lawfulness of such a 
                                                          
49
  
50 See Linda Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing 2004); Merijn Chamon, ‘Le recours à la soft 
law comme moyen d’éluder les obstacles constitutionnels au développement des agences de l’UE’ [2014] Revue de l’Union 
européenne 152. 
51 Inter alia, Case C-322/09 P, NDSHT v Commission [2010] EU:C:2010:701, para 46; Joined Cases 16-17/62, Confédération 
nationale des producteurs de fruits et légumes v Council [1962] EU:C:1962:47; Case C-366/88, France v Commission [1990] 
EU:C:1990:348, para 25. 
52 See the interpretation of this notion by the Court, inter alia, in Cases 8-11/66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. 
Cementsbedrijven N.V. and others v Commission, EU:C:1967:7; Case C-362/08 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v European 
Commission, EU:C:2010:40, para 52. 
53 About EMA’s opinion: ‘the revised opinion is an intermediate measure whose purpose is to prepare for the marketing 
authorisation decision. It is a preparatory measure which does not definitively lay down the Commission’s position and 
is therefore not a challengeable act’, T-326/99, Olivieri v Commission and EMA [2003] EU:T:2003:351, para 53. 
54 See, inter alia, Joined Cases 12/64 and 29/64, Ley v Commission [1965] EU:C:1965:28, para 118; Joined Cases T-10-12 
and 15/92, Cimenteries and others v Commission [1992] EU:T:1992:123, para 31; Case T-123/03, Pfizer v Commission [2004] 
EU:T:2004:167, para 24. 
55 Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, Artegodan GmbH v 
Commission [2002] EU:T:2002:283. See also T-326/99, Olivieri v Commission and EMA. 
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withdrawal, the Court addressed the issue of the scope of its review. Considering that “the 
Commission is not in a position to carry out scientific assessments of the efficacy and/or 
harmfulness of a medicinal product”,56 the Court recognised the “vital role accorded to an objective 
and detailed scientific assessment”57 by the agency, which is called to provide the institution with the 
evidence of scientific assessment which is essential for its decision-making. From this perspective, 
the Commission’s acts could be seen as a mere confirmation of the agency’s assessment.58 Therefore, 
the scope of the Court’s review included not only the Commission's exercise of its discretion, but 
also the legality of the EMA’s scientific opinion.59 Thus, analysing the agency’s statement of reasons 
(in a particularly strict way since it related to scientific uncertainty), the Court annulled the 
Commission’s decision as a consequence of the irregularities observed in the agency’s scientific 
assessment.60 
Such indirect judicial review of the agency’s de facto decision-making powers is justified by the 
significance of its acts in the determination of the outcome of the procedure for the adoption of the 
final act. Considering that “the content of [agency’s] opinions is an integral part of the statement of 
reasons on which [Commission’s] decisions [are] based”, they are “inextricably linked, the measure 
forming a whole”.61 However, where such an effect in the Commission’s decision is not proven, the 
indirect review of the agency’s act is not granted by the Court.62 
Despite the indirect review granted thanks to this case law, the solution adopted by the Court still 
appears to be unsatisfactory. Indeed, in case of exercise of de facto decision-making powers, the actual 
decision-maker remains concealed, attributing factiously the measures to the Commission’s 
discretion also where it merely rubber-stamps the agencies’ decisions.63 Moreover, since this review 
is dependent on the effect of the agencies’ decision on the final outcome, it may leave a gap in the 
judicial control of exercise of delegated powers of the agencies when they do not have a clear effect 
on the reviewable measure.64 Therefore, the jurisdictional remedies accorded in relation to pre-
decision-making agencies  are not equivalent to those available for genuine decision-making 
                                                          
56 Joined Cases T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH, para 198. 
57 Ibid, para 197. 
58 On this point, see also T-326/99, Olivieri v Commission and EMA, para 55. 
59 Joined Cases T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v Commission, para 197. 
60 Ibid, para 221. 
61 Case T-240/10, Hungary v Commission [2013] EU:T:2013:645, paras 82-91. 
62 Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 357. 
63 Madalina Busuioc, op. cit. (2013), 215. 
64 Ibid, 216. 
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agencies, thus making a difference between the two forms of exercise of powers. In the light of the 
increasing powers delegated de facto to the new agencies, this appears not entirely justifiable, entailing 
the risk of shielding their activities from judicial review.65 
 
  
                                                          
65 Herwig C. H. Hofmann and Alessandro Morini, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive 
through “Agencification”‘ [2012] 37 European Law Review, 442. 
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3. The Intensity of the Review of the Court 
The effectiveness and extent of judicial review depends not only on the reviewability of the acts 
before the Court but also on the intensity of the judicial review exercised by the judges in the 
contested acts. Indeed, the question on how far the Court goes in assessing the decision and 
reassessing the elements that lead the author to such a decision is crucial especially in relation to 
decisions involving discretion. In this regard, it is important to recall that judicial review generally 
involves a review on law, fact, and discretion.66 While the Court fully substitutes judgements of the 
parties in relation to questions of law, the intensity of review of fact and discretion is different since 
it needs to respect the institutional prerogatives of the author in deciding on the merit.67 In the 
balance between full judicial scrutiny and deference to the institutions’ assessment lies the standard 
of review of the Court.68 
3.1. The Case Law on Complex Economic or Technical Appraisals of EU Institutions 
In relation to the acts of EU institutions, the Court is called to exercise a comprehensive review of 
their legality, intensively scrutinising the exercise of their powers.69 However, when the exercise of 
discretion involves the evaluation of a complex economic or technical situation, the Court shows a 
rather deferential approach, which was evident especially in the past.70  
In particular, in the field of the common agricultural policy (CAP), the Court recognised that the EU 
institutions enjoyed “a broad discretion” in the choice of appropriate means of action in the light of 
the various objectives of the CAP.71 Therefore, “in reviewing the legality of the exercise of such 
                                                          
66 Paul Craig, op.cit., Chapter 13. 
67 Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, op. cit. (2011), 551. 
68 On the intensity of judicial review see, inter alia, Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Deference to the Administration in Judicial 
Review - EU report’, (on file from the author), pp. 1-19; Mariousz Baran, ‘The scope of EU Courts’ jurisdiction and 
review of administrative decisions - the problem of intensity control of legality’ in Carol Harlow, Päivi Leino and 
Giacinto Della Cananea (eds), Research Handbook on EU Administrative Law (Elgar 2017), 292-315; Roberto Caranta, 
‘Burden of Proof vs Duty to Give Reasons in Administrative Law’ in Gerencsér Balázs, Berkes Lilla e András Zs. Varga 
(eds), A hazai és az uniós közigazgatási eljárásjog aktuális kérdései (Pázmány Press 2015), 305-323; Karim Kouri, ‘The intensity 
of judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in merger cases’ [2007] Luxembourg journal of law, 
economics & finance 114. 
69 Giuseppe Tesauro, Diritto dell’Unione europea (4th edn, Cedam 2011), 252. 
70 See, inter alia, Case 42/84, Remia v Commission [1985] EU:C:1985:327, para 34; Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, BAT and 
Reynolds [1987] EU:C:1987:490, para 62; Case C-7/95, Deere v Commission [1998] EU:C:1998:256, para 34; Case C-272/09 
P, KME Germany v Commission [2011] EU:C:2011:810, para 39; Case C-87/00, Roberto Nicoli v Eridania SpA [2004] 
EU:C:2004:604, para 37. 
71 Inter alia, Case 57/72, Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Zucker [1973] EU:C:1973:30; Case C‑335/13, 
Robin John Feakins v The Scottish Ministers [2014] EU:C:2014:2343, paras. 56-58. This approach of the Court may find its 
origin in Article 33 ECSC, now repealed, which stated: ‘the Court may not review the conclusions of the High Authority, 
drawn from economic facts and circumstances, which formed the basis of such decisions or recommendations, except 
ISSN: 2589-2398 
16 
 
discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether it is not vitiated by a manifest error 
or misuse of power or whether the institution in question has not manifestly exceeded the limits of 
its discretion.”72 In other words, since the Commission alone is in the position to anticipate and 
evaluate ecological, scientific, technical, and economic changes of a complex and uncertain nature, 
the Court cannot substitute its own assessment of the matter for the Commission’s decision.73 
Such a light approach of the Court was also applied to other policy areas, whenever the EU 
institution’s decision involves complex economic or technical appraisals. However, in more recent 
judgments, and especially certain policy areas such as risk regulation and competition,74 the Court 
has undertaken a more intensive review of the exercise of powers, applying the test for assessing 
whether a manifest error occurred in a rigorous way.75 Such stricter scrutiny of the Court also in 
cases involving complex economic and technical appraisals was developed, in particular, through a 
renewed attention to the so-called duty of care, the obligation to state reasons, and the principle of 
proportionality.  
Firstly, since the early 1990s76 the Court has started to exercise a more circumscribed review on the 
assessment of the facts done by the Commission, especially in competition law cases. In assessing 
the factual evaluation of the Commission, the Court reiterated the standard formula for complex 
appraisals, but at the same time it started to stress the importance of the respect of the rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
where the High Authority is alleged to have abused its powers or to have clearly misinterpreted the provisions of the 
Treaty or of a rule of law relating to its application.’. See Alessandra Albanese, ‘Il sindacato sulla discrezionalità 
nell’ordinamento europeo’ [2018] Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario 131, 779. 
72 Case C-369/95, Somalfruit and others v Ministero delle Finanze [1997] EU:C:1997:562, para 50; Case C-354/95, National 
Farmer's Union and Others [1997] EU:C:1997:379, para 50. 
73 See, inter alia, Case C-87/00, Nicoli v Eridania [2004] EU:C:2004:305, para 37; Case T-123/97, Solomon v Commission 
[1999] EU:T:1999:245, para 47; Case T-333/10, Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV and Others v European Commission 
[2013] EU:T:2013:451, para 64. 
74 See, inter alia, C-12/03, Tetra Laval [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:87; C-501/06, GlaxoSmithKline [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:610; T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:209; C-15/10, Etimine [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:504; C-425/08, Enviro Tech [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:635. For an analysis of the review in risk 
regulation, see in particular Ellen Vos, ‘The European Court of Justice in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty and 
Complexity’, in Bruno De Witte, Elise Muir and Mark Dawson (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice 
(Cheltenham 2013), 142-166. In competition law, see Andriani Kalinkiri, ‘What’s in a name? The marginal standard of 
review of “complex economic assessments” in EU competition enforcement’ [2016] 53 Common Market Law Review 1283, 
pp. 1283-1316; Karim Kouri, ‘The intensity of judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in 
merger cases’ [2007] Luxembourg journal of law, economics & finance 114. 
75 Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review – EU Report’ (on file with the author), 4; 
Alessandra Albanese, op. cit. (2018), 781.  
76 The seminal case is C-269/90, Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:1991:438. See 
Herwig Hofmann, ‘The Interdependence between Delegation, Discretion and the Duty of Care’, in Joana Mendes (ed), 
Discretion in EU Law (Hart Bloomsberg 2019). 
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guaranteed by the EU legal order.77 Among those guarantees is, in particular, “the obligation […] to 
examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the situation in question and to give an 
adequate statement of the reasons for its decisions.”78 Thus, through the lenses of the so-called 
“duty of care” and the obligation to state reasons, the Court proceeds to examine the Commission’s 
analysis of the technical facts and the interests involved, annulling the decision should the 
assessment of the EU authority be insufficiently complete or impartial.79 
In particular, with specific reference to the assessment of scientific facts, the change in the approach 
of the Court is exemplified by the paradigmatic Pfizer case, which involved the acquisition of 
technical advice from a scientific body. Here, the applicant brought proceedings against a Council 
regulation which withdrew authorisation for an additive to animal feeding stuff.80 The decision was 
based on an opinion of the Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition on the risk it posed to human 
health. The Court, after repeating the traditional formula on the limited judicial review of complex 
technical appraisals,81 proceeded to carry out a close assessment of the applicant’s claims regarding 
fact and discretion. In this, it applied the test for manifest error in a way which went far beyond its 
earlier practice.82 Therefore, without explicitly departing from its previous case law, the Court has 
arguably changed the standard of its judicial review through an evolving interpretation of what the 
assessment of a “manifest error” entails.83 
Finally, a promising role in limiting the discretion of the EU administration and widening the scope 
of judicial scrutiny is played by the principle of proportionality. While in some cases the compliance 
with this principle is problematically equated simply with the lack of manifest inappropriateness of 
                                                          
77 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, para 14. See also Case T-54/99, max.mobil [2002] EU:T:2002:20; Case T-
342/99, Airtours [2004] EU:T:2004:192; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval; Case T-351/03 [2007] Schneider Electric v Commission, 
EU:T:2007:212. 
78 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler [2015] EU:C:2015:400, para 69. 
79 Herwig Hofmann, op.cit. (2019). 
80 Case T-13/99, Pfizer v Commission [2002] EU:T:2002:209. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Ellen Vos, ‘The 
European Court of Justice in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty and Complexity’, op. cit. (2013), 152-160. See also Case 
C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] EU:C:2005:87, esp. para 39: ‘Whilst the Court recognises that the 
Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community 
Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only 
must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to 
assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. Such a review is all 
the more necessary in the case of a prospective analysis required when examining a planned merger with conglomerate 
effect.’ 
81 Case T-13/99, Pfizer, para 166. 
82 Ellen Vos, op. cit. (2013), 152-160 ; Antonia Albanese, op.cit. (2018), 783. 
83 Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review – EU Report’ (on file with the author), 10; 
Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) , 415-416. 
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the measure, 84 in other cases this principle has proven to be a valuable tool in the hand of the 
European judges, especially when associated with the duty of care.85 Thus, for instance, in Gauweiler 
the Court effectively combined the two principles: it was under the assessment of the 
proportionality of the measures that the Court recalled the broad discretion enjoyed by the 
European Central Bank and the obligation “to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant 
elements of the situation in question and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its 
decisions.”86 Although in that case this examination did not lead to the annulment of the measures at 
stake, the Court carried out a thorough analysis of the discretion of the institution, demonstrating a 
significant evolution in the exercise of its scrutiny.87 
3.2. The Intensity of Review of EU Agencies’ Discretion: The Case of ECHA 
Focusing now specifically on EU agencies, it is arguable that, in the abstract, the intensity of judicial 
review of their powers may be influenced by two opposing considerations, leading to a more lenient 
or a more intensive scrutiny.88 On the one hand, the institutional independence and the specific 
expertise that agencies enjoy may justify a certain deference towards agencies’ competent 
assessment, which cannot be substituted by the judgement of an institution lacking the scientific and 
technical knowledge on the matter.89 On the other hand, precisely because the agencies enjoy a 
considerable autonomy from political oversight, this should be compensated by a closer examination 
of their acts by the courts, aimed at strengthening the accountability of these bodies.90 
Determining whether the approach of the Court is driven more by the former or the latter 
consideration, and how intense the actual scrutiny exercised by the Court is, requires a systematic 
analysis of the judgments concerning the powers of EU  agencies. For the purposes of this paper, 
the analysis is focused on the case law concerning the European Chemical Agency (ECHA). Based 
in Helsinki, this agency provides scientific and technical expertise in the field of chemicals regulation 
                                                          
84 See C-59/11, Association Kokopelli [2012] EU:C:2012:442, para 38. The approach of the Court was criticized by AG 
Kokott in her Opinion in Case C-558/07, SPCM and others [2009] EU:C:2009:142, paras 73-77. 
85 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, op.cit. (2019). 
86 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler [2015] EU:C:2015:400, paras 66-69. For an analysis of the judgment and its implications for 
the exercise of discretion by EU administrative actors, see Joana Mendes, ‘Discretion, Care and Public Interests in the 
EU Administration: Probing the Limits of Law’ [2016] 53 Common Market Law Review 419. 
87 See also, inter alia, Case C-556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) [2016] EU:C:2016:207. 
88 For a theoretical and comparative analysis of the judicial scrutiny of agency action, see Tom Zwart, ‘Judicial Review of 
Agency action: The Scope of Review’ in Tom Zwart and Luc Verhey (eds), Agencies in European and Comparative Law 
(Intersentia 2003), 171-178. 
89 Example of this attitude is the famous US case Chevron USA v Natural Resources Defence Council [1984] 467 US 837. 
90 Tom Zwart, op. cit. (2003), 172. 
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and assists in the implementation of the EU's chemicals legislation.91 Within its tasks, ECHA adopts 
acts not only of individual application, but also of general application.92 
The analysis of the case law regarding the acts of ECHA shows that the Court has resorted to the 
described formula on highly complex scientific and technical facts. In particular, this clearly emerged 
in a series of parallel judgments of the General Court of 2013,93 subsequently upheld by the Court of 
Justice,94 and became settled case law in later cases concerning the discretion of the ECHA.95 Quite 
interestingly, all these cases concerned the identification of a certain substance as a “substance of 
very high concern” under the REACH regulation,96 which was qualified as a regulatory act not 
entailing implementing measures within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU by the Court. 
The Court acknowledged that in these cases the “review by the European Union judicature is limited 
to verifying whether there has been a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers, or 
whether those authorities have manifestly exceeded the limits of their discretion.”97 Accordingly, the 
Court is not allowed to substitute its assessment of scientific or technical facts for that of the 
agency.98 Moreover, the broad discretion of ECHA is recognised not only in relation to “the nature 
and scope of the measures to be taken but also, to some extent, to the finding of the basic facts.”99 
Accordingly, on these aspects the Court exercises only a marginal scrutiny, resulting in the 
annulment of the act only as far as it is proven that it is manifestly inappropriate.100 Therefore, it 
                                                          
91 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency [2006] OJ L 396.  
92 The latters were cosidered by the Court ‘regulatory acts’ within the meaning of Article 263(4) TFEU. See Case T-
94/10, Rütgers and others v ECHA [2013] EU:T:2013:107, para 57. See also Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and others 
v ECHA [2013] EU:T:2013:106; Case T-95/10, Cindu Chemicals and other v ECHA [2013] EU:T:2013:108; Case T‑96/10, 
Rütgers and others v ECHA [2013] EU:T:2013:109. 
93 Case T-93/10, Bilbaìna de Alquitranes; Case T-94/10, Rütgers,; Case T-95/10, Cindu; Case T‑96/10, Rütgers and others. 
94 Case C-287/13 P, Bilbaìna de Alquitranes v ECHA [2014] EU:C:2014:599; Case C-288/13 P, Rütgers [2014] 
EU:C:2014:2176.; Case C-289/10, Cindu Chemicals [2014] EU:C:2014:2175; Case C-290/13 P, Rütgers [2014] 
EU:C:2014:2174. 
95 See Case T-177/12, Spraylat [2014] EU:T:2014:849; Case T-135/13, Hitachi Chemical Europe [2015] EU:T:2015:253; 
Case T-134/13, Polynt and Sitre [2015] EU:T:2015:254; Case T-115/15, Deza [2017] EU:T:2017:329; Case T-268/10 
RENV, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group [2015] EU:T:2015:698. 
96 Article 57 of Regulation EC No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2006] OJ L 396. 
97 Case T-93/10, Bilbaìna de Alquitranes, para 76. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid, para 77. 
100 Case T-96/10, Rütgers, para 134. 
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appears that the judicial review is not really intensive, irrespective of the fact that the political 
control is rather limited.101 
However, such an approach is tempered by the need to show that “in adopting the act [the EU 
authorities] actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking into consideration of all 
the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate.”102 From this 
consideration, the Court moves to carry out a lengthy and detailed examination of the elements 
which constituted the basis of the ECHA’s decision.103 In this sense, this consideration appears to 
play a role similar to the one attributed to the duty of care in cases concerning other EU institutions, 
as a judicial tool to exercise a stricter scrutiny on the agency’s discretion.  
Yet, qualitatively, the scrutiny of the Court did not actually review the substance of the Agency’s 
scientific appraisal. In this regard, particularly enlightening is the comparison with a subsequent 
judgment of the Court (hereafter, “Bilbaìna II”),104  which concerned the same applicants, the same 
substance and the same methodology disputed in one of the aforementioned cases of 2013 
(hereafter, Bilbaìna I).105 In Bilbaìna II, the applicants challenged the classification of the same 
substance as an Acuatic Acute 1 (H400) and Acuatic cronic 1 (H410) substance by the Commission. 
After recalling the “manifest error” formula, the Court did not limit its scrutiny to a “procedural 
review” such as the one carried out in Bilbaìna I with regard to ECHA’s assessment of all the 
relevant factors. On the contrary, vis-à-vis the Commission it arguably applied “a much more 
intrusive standard of scrutiny, blurring the boundaries between the procedural review of any alleged 
manifest error of assessment and the substantive review of the scientific soundness of the [applied] 
method”.106 If it is true that Bilbaìna II marks a step in the latent evolution of the Court’s 
interpretation on the duty to take “all relevant factors” into account,107 it is not less true that, in a 
very similar scenario, the Court demonstrated more willingness to exercise a more intrusive scrutiny 
towards the Commission than towards an EU agency. 
                                                          
101 Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016),  364. 
102 Case T-93/10, Bilbaìna de Alquitranes, para 77. 
103 As expressly recognized by the Court in Case C-419/17 P, Deza, para 81. However, for a remarkably short evaluation 
of the factors and circumstances, see Case T-268/10 RENV, Polyelectrolyte, paras 76-79. 
104 Case C-691/15 P, European Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes (Bilbaìna II), ECLI:EU:C:2017:882. 
105 Case T-93/10, Bilbaìna de Alquitranes. 
106 Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘The fine line between procedural and substantive review in cases involving complex 
technical-scientific evaluations: Bilbaìna’ [2018] 55 Common Market Law Review 1217, 1242. 
107 Ibid, 1240. 
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Interestingly, the Court does not refer to the duty of care nor to the obligation to state reasons in its 
review of the agency’s assessment.108 While the relevance of these concepts in limiting the agency 
discretion appears thus rather marginal in the case law regarding ECHA, a more interesting role is 
played by the principle of proportionality. In assessing the compliance of the ECHA’s decisions with 
the proportionality principle, the Court contends that the measure is considered not proportionate 
only if it is “manifestly inappropriate” having regard to the objective of the basic regulation. At the 
same time, it also emphasises that the agency “has a broad discretion in a sphere which entails 
political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake 
complex assessments”.109 Thus, the Court appears to go even further in its recognition of the 
discretion of the agency, acknowledging a form of discretion which appears to go beyond the sphere 
of scientific assessment of facts, problematically recognising a margin of discretion in policy choices 
which are generally the reserved domain of the legislator.110 Arguably, this approach raises significant 
questions not only on the scope of judicial review of the proportionality of the measures, but also on 
the extent and the kind of discretion delegated to EU agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
108 Even when expressly raised by the parties, see Case C-650/15 P, Polyelectrolyte, para 69. 
109 See Case T-94/10, Rütgers and others, para 134. 
110 To use the words of Dominique Ritleng, ‘The Reserved Domain of the Legislature. The Notion of Essential 
Elements of an Area’ in Carl Frederik Bergstrom and Dominique Ritleng (eds), Rulemaking by the European Commission. The 
New System for Delegation of Powers (Oxford University Press 2016), 133-155. 
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4. The Implications of the Limited Review of the Acts of EU Agencies 
In the light of the examined case law, it appears that the Court exercises a limited review of EU 
agencies’ powers. Considering in particular the shaky foundations on which the legitimacy of EU 
agencies is grounded, such findings may raise significant concerns in relation to important 
constitutional principles which shape the EU institutional structure and to the specific limits which 
embed the delegation of powers to these bodies. 
Firstly, the scope of judicial review is inherently related to the principle of effective judicial 
protection, which has to be guaranteed by the Court under Article 19 TEU.111 This fundamental 
principle of EU law risks to be jeopardised should the Court refrain from exercising an effective 
judicial review on the activities of EU agencies due to this deferential approach. Considering that the 
agencies are generally delegated powers precisely to carry out technical and scientific work, the 
ultimate result would be that most of their activities fall outside the scope of a full review by the 
Court. It is, thus, questionable whether this is compatible with this principle, with the right to an 
effective legal remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter112 and with the basic tenets of the rule 
of law.113 
Secondly, the fundamental notion of separation of powers lies at the heart of the issue at stake.114 
Indeed, considering that the Court should not substitute its judgement to the discretion attributed to 
the EU institutions and bodies, the limited scope of judicial review aims at preserving the 
prerogatives of the EU executive bodies in policy-making. An excessive deference to their appraisals, 
however, has the opposite effect of compromising the Court’s prerogatives. It fundamentally affects 
the role of the Court in the “balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure 
of the community”.115 Drawing the line between reviewable assessments and complex scientific 
                                                          
111 See AG Jacobs in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1991] EU:C:1991:317. On the principle of effective 
judicial protection, see C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
[1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:206. On a recent link between Article 19 TEU and 47 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, see inter alia Case C-284/16, Achmea [2018] EU:C:2018:158. 
112 Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this regard, some interesting insights may be inferred also from 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. See, for instance, Albert and La Compte (1983) 5 EHRR 533, 
Schnaitzer (1995) ECHR, Menarini (2011) ECHR, Bryan (1995) ECHR, Sigma (2011) ECHR. 
113 See Case 294/83, Les Verts. 
114 Herwig Hofmann, op.cit. (2019). See also Miro Prek and Silvère Lefevre, ‘Administrative, discretion, Power of 
Appraisal and Margin of Appraisal in Judicial Review Proceedings before the General Court’ [2019] 56 Common Market 
Law Review 339, 362. 
115 Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni [1958] EU:C:1958:8, 151.  
ISSN: 2589-2398 
23 
 
assessments, therefore, amounts to redesigning the division of competences between the judiciary 
and the executive in the EU legal order.116  
Thirdly, the limited scope of judicial review of EU powers problematically affects also the 
institutional balance between the EU agencies and the legislator. Remarkably, this approach of the 
Court in the judicial review of agencies’ acts sits uneasily with the limits on the delegation of powers 
which were identified in relation to EU agencies. Indeed, the recognition that the ECHA is called to 
exercise discretion in “political, economic and social choices” is at odds with the prohibition to 
delegate discretionary powers enshrined in Meroni.117 According to the Court, the respect for the 
principle of institutional balance demands that the political choices should be reserved for the 
legislator, and the agencies’ empowerment limited to “clearly defined executive powers”.118 Arguably, 
the scope of discretion acknowledged in Rütgers appears to go beyond the traditional limits of the 
Meroni doctrine.119 Even considering the relaxing of this Meroni requirement in the Short Selling case, 
which has sanctioned the possibility to confer on agencies discretionary powers as long as they are 
“precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review”,120 the compatibility of these two lines of case 
law appears controversial.121 This is even more controversial in the light of the fact that in EU law, 
different from the administrative law tradition of certain national systems,122 the distinction between 
“administrative” and “technical” discretion of the public authorities is far from being established,123 
leaving somehow answered the question not only how much discretion is (and can be) attributed to 
EU agencies, but also which kind of discretion. 
                                                          
116 On the interplay between separation of powers and institutional balance, see Jean-Paul Jacque’, ‘The Principle of 
Institutional Balance’ [2004] 41 Common Market Law Review 383, 384; Gerard Conway, ‘Recovering a Separation of 
Powers in the European Union’ [2011] 17 European Law Journal 304, 319; Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca (eds), op. cit. 
(1999), 58. As an example of the attitude of the Court, see Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Case C-220/15, 
Commission v Germany [2016] EU:C:2016:534, para 39. 
117 Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni, 151. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Herwig Hofmann, Gerard Rowe and Alexander Turk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2011), 244. 
120 Case C‑270/12, UK v Parliament and Council (Short Selling), EU:C:2014:18, para 53. 
121 Merijn Chamon, ‘The Empowerment of Agencies under the Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: comment on 
United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (Short Selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism’ [2014] 39 
European Law Review No. 3, 396. The author interestingly remarks that Schräder and Rütgers are not mentioned in Short 
Selling. It is equally interesting to remark that in the following cases, Deza and Polynt and Sitre, Short Selling is not 
mentioned. 
122 See, for instance, Massimo Severo Giannini, Diritto amministrativo (Giuffrè 1988), 150. 
123 For some reflections on the nature of discretion in EU law, see Joana Mendes, “Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A 
Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU” [2017] The Modern Law Review No. 3, 443-472; Miro Prek and Silvere 
Lefevre, “‘Administrative Discretion’, ‘Power of Appraisal’ and ‘Margin of Appraisal’ in Judicial Review Proceedings 
before the General Court’” [2019] Common Market Law Review, 339-380; Joana Mendes (ed), Discretion in EU Law (Hart 
Bloomsberg 2019). 
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Finally, the limited judicial scrutiny of the Court on the agencies’ exercise of discretion casts some 
doubts on the respect of the requirement expressed in Short Selling that the exercise of agencies’ 
powers must be “amenable to judicial review in the light of the legislator’s objectives”.124 It is 
questionable whether the strict supervision required in that case is satisfied by the rather marginal 
judicial review exercised by the Court in relation to agencies’ complex appraisals. This is very 
problematic in the light of the grounds on which the legitimacy of EU agencies is based. Indeed, in 
the absence of an express legal basis in the Treaties, the requirements enshrined in Short Selling, 
including judicial review, are not only the limits, but also the crucial conditions for the legality of 
these bodies under EU law. Limiting the scope of judicial review, thus, risks undermining the 
position of EU agencies within the EU institutional system.125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
124 Case C-270/12, UK v. Council of the European Union and European Parliament (Short Selling) [2014] EU:C:2014:18, para 53. 
On the point, see Merijn Chamon, op. cit. (2014), 396; Herwig Hofmann, Gerard Rowe and Alexander Turk, op. cit. 
(2011), 244. 
125 Carlo Tovo, op. cit. (2016), 365. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the judicial review of the powers of EU agencies, examining the possibility 
to challenge the acts of these bodies under Article 263 TFEU and the intensity of the scrutiny of the 
Court on their assessments. On the first aspect, it was described how the evolution of primary law 
and of the case law has filled the lacunae that the initial legal framework presented. Yet, some 
relative gaps may still be recognised, in particular in relation to the activities of pre-decision-making 
agencies. Also, it is worth recalling that these issues need to be considered in the context of the 
limited locus standi granted to individuals before the Court in general. Not only for the challenge of 
EU agencies’ acts, the admissibility requirements for actions for annulment are interpreted in a 
particularly restrictive manner by the Court, raising doubts on the effectiveness of access to justice 
and on the actual completeness of the EU system of legal remedies and procedures.126 
On the second aspect, although based on a case-law analysis limited to ECHA,127 the preliminary 
findings of this research show that the scope of judicial review of EU agencies’ powers is explicitly 
limited since the Court recognises a broad discretion to these bodies in carrying out complex 
scientific and technical assessments. A detailed discussion of the factors taken into consideration in 
the agency’s assessment may be undertaken by the Court through the need to show that the agency 
“actually exercised their discretion”, potentially counterbalancing the weak control granted under the 
abovementioned formula. However, in relation to these decentralised bodies, the Court has so far 
exercised a less intrusive scrutiny than in relation to the European Commission. Moreover, no 
significant role is played by the duty of care and by the obligation to state reasons, which proved to 
be useful tools in the hand of the Court to exercise a stricter scrutiny of EU institutions’ discretion. 
With regard to the principle of proportionality, in the analysed case law it appears to be used as a 
                                                          
126 See, in particular, the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council 
[2002] EU:C:2002:197, para 102. See the criticism in , inter alia, Dimitry Kochenov, Grainne De Burca and Andrew 
Williams, Europe’s Democratic Deficit? (Hart Publishing 2015); Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, op. cit. (2011), 506-507; 
Mariolina Eliantonio,‎ Chris W. Backes,‎ C.H. Van Rhee,‎ Taru Spronken,‎ Anna Berlee (eds), Standing Up for Your Right in 
Europe: A Comparative Study on Legal Standing (Locus Standi) Before the EU and Member States' Courts (Intersentia 2013), 45; 
Paul Nihoul, ‘La recevabilité des recours en annulation introduits par un particulier à l'encontre d'un acte communautaire 
de portée générale’ [1994] Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 171; Denis F. Waelbroeck and A.-M. Verheyden, ‘Les 
conditions de recevabilité des recours en annulation des particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires : à la 
lumière du droit comparé et de la Convention des droits de l'homme’ [1995] Cahiers de droit européen 399. 
127 There are, however, some evidence that the approach of the Court is similar in relation to other genuine decision-
making agencies, such as CPVO (see Case T-187/06, Schräder v CPVO [2008] EU:T:2008:511, upheld on appeal in Case 
C-38/09 P, Schräder v CPVO [2010] EU:C:2010:196) and some pre-decision-making agencies (see Joined Cases T-74/00, 
T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, Artegodan, para 201. See also Case C-120/97, 
Upjohn Ltd v The Licensing Authority [1999] EU:C:1999:14, para 34.) 
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catalyst for stressing the broad discretion of the agency also in relation to political, economic and 
social choices, rather than an effective brake to their powers.  
As a result, the scope of review of EU agencies’ powers appears rather limited, raising significant 
concerns in relation to some important constitutional principles on which the EU is based. In the 
light of the problematic implications outlined, a stricter standard of review would appear more in 
line with the requirements set by the Court for a legitimate delegation of powers under EU law. 
While it is doubtful that the Court constitutes the appropriate forum for scientific assessments, the 
development of judicial devices to look closer at the exercise of the discretion - such as the 
application of the duty of care, the obligation to state reasons and a stricter assessment of the 
proportionality principle – arguably appears even more necessary in relation to the agencification 
process.  
Equally necessary appears further research on fundamental notions related to the exercise of public 
action in EU law. Indeed, a better conceptualisation of the notions of merit and discretion, as well as 
a clearer distinction between administrative and technical discretion, would shed light on the nature 
of the powers involved and the appropriate extent of the scrutiny of the Court. These notions, and 
their implications for the limits of the review of the Court, would deserve closer scholarly attention, 
which this contribution has tried to raise through a first analysis of the case law concerning the 
ECHA. 
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